Towards Legal Understanding: I by Nelles, Walter
TOWARDS LEGAL UNDERSTANDING: I
"Constitutional grants of power and restrictions upon the exercise of
power are not flexible as the doctrines of the common law are flexible."
-Sutherland, J., dissenting in the Minnesota Moratorium case.'
The sentence quoted below the title was the inspiration of this ar-
ticle. It is not its thesis. The article has two aims: first to explain, and
if possible escape, confusion about what law is and what makes and
changes it; then to go on towards showing how, if at all, law may be
brought nearer to possessing in all its parts what was anciently consid-
ered its essential characteristic-satisfactoriness to all socially tolerable
persons.2
THE STATUS QUO WITH RESPECT TO LEGAL TRUTH
When they learn facts which cannot be reconciled with established
conceptions of the physical universe, scientists reject the conceptions,
not the facts. "In the last six years, the whole plan of the constitution
of atomic structure has been rewritten. '" 3 The plan of the constitution
or nature of law gets revised less quickly. For jurists resist awareness
that one-time true enough conceptions lose their truth when clear ob-
servers find that they no longer fit the facts. Yet that certitudes are al-
ways decaying and getting superseded is obvious almost anywhere in
human experience, if looked for. Gilbert Lewis in The Anatomy of
Science4 illuminates the process -through an imaginary tale which is
worth re-telling here.
Once in the South Seas an island people had occasion to measure
accurately their cocoanut plantations. An observer discovered Euclid-
ean plane geometry, which got the name of Uli. Uli checked and
worked perfectly when used in mapping, measuring and dividing the
small flat island, and long seemed to work as well for charting the sea
and laying out courses for canoe voyages. With the aid of the com-
pass, which the islanders had stumbled upon, distant islands were lo-
cated on a checkerboard Uli chart. The parallel lines of the chart were
like lines of latitude and longitude on a map made on Mercator's pro-
jection. But they were believed, of course, to be equidistant, ten days'
'See Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 245 (1934).2 Nothing could be law, according to Bracton, unless it had "the common
warrant of the body politic" (rei y ublicae sponsio conununs). DE LEGIxUS (C.
1250) fols. 1, lb; trans. Twiss (1878) 3, 9, 13.
'W. F. G. SWANN, THE ARcHiTEcTuIE OF THE UNIVERSE (1934) 100.
4 (1926) 34-38.
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paddling apart. And to a certain island, Ilo, due west by compass, a
course due vest, straight as platted on the Uli chart, was supposed to be
straight in fact, and the shortest course possible. By the due west
course, the distance was forty days' paddling. But once a canoe cap-
tain bound for Ilo, his compass skewed by an iron amulet he was wear-
ing, found himself near another island which he knew to be far south
of the regular course for Ilo. He discarded his amulet and, steering
west by north, reached Ilo-and found to his amazement that his whole
voyage has been made in two days less than thi usual forty. Thereafter,
repeated experiments established that his accidental course-a curve
bowing to south as graphed on the Uli chart-was in fact beyond doubt
two days shorter than the due west course from home to Ilo.
A queer but observing young man asserted that this de facto but
inexplicably shortest course was misrepresented as graphed on the Uli
chart,-that it was really straight, and Uli therefore was untrue. And
after he had been tried for heresy, and cooked and eaten, other observ-
ers, surreptitiously at first, checked, corrected and carried on his observa-
tions, finally achieving a spherical geometry whereby true distances and
shortest courses for long voyages could be worked out on paper. "The
new advanced geometry was soon accepted and taught to mariners under
the name Uliao, which means 'more than Uli.' It was found that the
old elementary Uli was still perfectly satisfactory for the home, and
thence arose the saying, 'Uli for the minnow, Uliao for the shark.'"
A legal Uli seemed for centuries to check and work, with occasional
improvements. Its basic postulates are that Law is impersonal, impar-
tial, stable, certain, regular and benign, created, maintained, and from
time to time perfected by "common warrant of the body politic."5 -Ex-
periences inconsistent with it, as the short course to Ilo was with Euclid-
ean geometry, have long been not uncommon. But when such expe-
riences could not comfortably be ignored, experts added to legal Uli
doctrines through which inconsistent experience could, ex post facto, be
represented as consistent.
Modern scepticism as to legal Uli commenced when Bentham and
his disciples adopted and amplified the Hobbian heresy that law is a
creature of the selfish wills of dominant human powers. But the teeth
of this heresy were drawn by conception of dominant human power as
in the Sovereign, sovereignty as in The People, or Society, and Society
as a single living organism with an unselfish selfish will.: Practicing
lawyers were sometimes cynical about legal Uli in private; Aaron Burr,
for instance, is said to have remarked that "law is that which is plausibly
' BRACTON, loc. cit. supra note 2.
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asserted and confidently maintained." But for active members of the
profession, including teachers, open heresy entailed too much danger of
being cooked and eaten to be much risked, and orthodoxy, often deeply
sincere, was long but little shaken. As late as the time of Ames (with
Gray there, too, but with views unknown to students) the air of the
Harvard Law School was reverential. Bad decisions were "not law".
Bad judges could not taint Law's essential purity. Whatever ravishers
attacked, she always, in the tale as told, escaped them. Gilbertian irrev-
erence could be enjoyed; for her excellence was so securely vested
that it could not harm her. But eminent legal scholars-Holmes, Gray,
Dicey, Pound-were already letting cats out of the bag, and getting
little help from legal Uli in their efforts to make rhyme and reason of
their scampering.6 And since Cardozo's first book,7 increasing numbers
(somewhat listed by Llewellyn) 8 have carried on with some consensus,
to aggregate results which are none too coherent.
Legal Uli still works fairly well for a good many practical purposes.
And users who go outside it at a pinch, taking uncharted short courses
which they have stumbled on, may persuade themselves that for all pur-
poses it still, on the whole, works well enough. While discoverers are
groping not unconfusedly towards a legal Uliao, and sometimes display-
ing intemperateness if not bad temper (as perhaps they must if they are
to get a hearing), it is natural that those who can tinker Uli so that it
still seems to work after a fashion should cling to the old familiar
clearer "science".
Judicial opinions still, with few exceptions, represent decisions as
governed by legal Uli. A recent case illustrates the inadequacy of that
science as a science of law. In Funk v. United States the question was
whether the conviction of a prohibition agent charged with conspiring
with bootleggers should be reversed for error in excluding the de-
fendant's wife from testifying in his favor. On the face of fairly recent
decisions of the Supreme Court this was not error; in outward seeming
it was still law that a wife may not testify for her defendant husband in
a federal criminal case. 10
'Holmes, The Gas Stokers' Strike (1873) 7 Am. L. REv. 583, reprinted in
(1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. '95; THE COMMON LAW (1881) ; The Path of the Law
(1897) 10 HARV. L. REv. 457; Law in Science-Science it Law (1899) 12 HARV.
L. REV. 433; GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909); DICEY, LAW
AND-OPINION (1905); Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908) 8 COLUMBIA LAW
REV. 608; The Common Law and Legislation (1908) 21 HARv. L. REV. 383;
Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454; Law it Books and Law in Action
(1910) 44 Am. L. REv. 12.
"THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
' See Some Realism about Realism (1931) 44 HARv. L. REV. 1232, 1257.
954 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933). Opinion by Sutherland, J.; Cardozo, J., concurred
in result; McReynolds and Butler, J.J., dissented.
" Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79 (1911); Jim Fuey Moy v. United
States, 254 U. S. 189 (1920).
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But the court, examining legal history, found that both common
and statute law as to testimonial competency had changed much during
the'past hundred years. In 1851, by construction of federal statutes,
the testimonial law for federal criminal cases comprised the common-law
rules which were familiar and well understood in the thirteen original
states when the federal courts were established in 1789.11 The conmion
law as of the time of admission to the union of the state in which the
federal court was sitting was substituted in 1891.12 And later cases
soon substituted for that the common law as it is at the time of the
trial.'3
The later cases reject the notion "that the courts, in the face of
greatly changed conditions, are still chained to the ancient formulae and
are powerless to declare and enforce modifications deemed to have been
wrought in the common law itself by force of these changed conditions."
Much other judicial saying supports-nay, "makes axiomatic"-the ab-
stract proposition that the common law by its own principles adapts it-
self to fundamentally changed conditions; indeed, "this flexibility and
capacity for growth is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common
law."
Has the common law changed its ancient rule that the wife of a man
on trial for crime may not testify for him? Other ancient testimonial
disqualifications-the rule, for instance, that a defendant may not testify
in his own behalf-have been wiped out by statutes. Though such
statutes cannot change other common-law rules than those to which they
specifically relate, they are evidence of changed conditions which may
do so. And decisions already cited show that the common law sua
sponte now, contrary to its former rule, allows testimony in a criminal
case by a co-defendant not himself on trial.
The changed conditions thus reflected by modern trends of legisla-
tion and adjudication are, according to the opinion, these: The in-
creased intelligence of an advancing society has perceived that the
danger to the administration of justice upon which the whole group of
ancient testimonial disqualifications rested, viz., the danger that inter-
ested witnesses would not speak the truth, "never was as great as
claimed"; has perceived also that the danger, such as it was, "has been
minimized almost to the vanishing point by the test of cross-examination,
the increased intelligence of jurors, and perhaps other circumstances."
The basis in reason of all common-law rules of evidence--"their adap-
tation to the successful development of the truth"--abides. But experi-
' United States v. Reid, 12 How. (U. S.) 361 (1851).
12 Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263 (1891).
" Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325 (1892) ; Rosen v. United States, 245
U. S. 467 (1918).
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ence, which is "of all teachers the most dependable," has clearly
demonstrated the fallacy of believing that the old disqualifications for
interest, or some of them (the opinion cautiously refrains from going
the full length to which its reasoning might carry it), are well adapted to
the successful development of the truth.
Therefore, though the federal courts have no power to amend or
repeal any given rule or principle of the common law-"they neither
have nor claim that power"-it is their duty, since power to do so is
firmly vested in them by authoritative cases, to decide the question of
conjugal disqualification "in accordance with present-day standards of
wisdom and justice," and to "decline to enforce the ancient rule of the
common law under conditions as they now exist." The court accord-
ingly holds that the wife of a defendant in a criminal case is a competent
witness on his behalf ; and its prior decisions, insofar as they are inhar-
monious, "are now overruled." The competency of a wife to testify
against her husband "is not involved."
Thus with due ceremonial ritual was solemnized the passing of a
rule long dying. The pretty picture painted in the funeral sermon is
satisfying to cravings for suave harmony of form and color. And if
beauty is truth, and serenity the test of beauty, it is all we need to know.
But if when we look closely the picture seems rather to hide than show
the work of legal engineering it veneers, aesthetic satisfaction in its con-
templation is displaced by scientific curiosity.
What was the reason for disliking the old rule? Is the stated
reason true-that the danger to "the successful development of the
truth" from the lyings of interested witnesses "has been minimized al-
most to the vanishing point by the test of cross-examination, the in-
creased intelligence of jurors, and perhaps other circumstances?" In
modern trial by battle the victorious champion is not infrequently the
dirtier cross-examiner. And even relatively scrupulous cross-examiners
often can and do lead judge or jury to disbelieve the true testimony of
an interested witness. Whether any witness can get credence hangs
more upon his clearness of head and force of personality than upon the
truth of his story. No witness is in fact disinterested; even one who is
neutral as between the parties is far from indifferent to the impression
which his testimony will make. The most honest may suppress or stretch
or color a little. Few witnesses are neutral as between the parties; for
an experienced trial lawyer will rarely, unless in desperate straits, call
one whom he does not know as 'friendly,' and whose intended testimony
he has not previously censored, ethically, of course, in private confer-
ence. Unless a witness is of uncommon human clay, a skilful cross-
examiner can usually dramatize some trifling suppression or exaggera-
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tion, at the least, to the discredit of what truth he told. And parties to
causes and their wives are apt to be the easiest game for cross-examin-
ers. They are not much more likely to lie than other witnesses, and much'
more likely to be deemed liars when they are not and found out when
they are. All that post-medieval wisdom and justice can confidently be
said to have discovered is that there seems to be no good reason for not
giving parties and their wives as much freedom to swear in court as
other honest folk and liars.
That was the reason for wanting the old rule to fall. What were
the conditions and forces in, through or by which it fell?
The conditions obviously included general distaste for such rules
and, as the opinion truly shows, a fairish frequency of instances in which
similar rules have been abolished by statutes and decisions; also a fairish
sprinkling of 'authorities' for the abstract propositions that "the com-
mon law by its own principles adapts itself to changed conditions" and
that judges have power, which they are duty-bound to use, to see to it
that the common law performs its self-adaptations.
What were the forces which overthrew the rule? The conditions?
The authorities, or judicial duty under them? If so, why did the condi-
tions compel and the authorities authorize, or vice versa, in December,
1933, instead of much earlier or much later? And why did these forces
control only the seven justices who concurred in the decision and not
the two dissenters?
Certainly the conditions mattered. At any time for at least a
hundred years any and all of the old rules of testimonial disqualification
could have fallen without causing dissatisfaction anywhere in society
except among members of the legal profession. In the middle period of
the nineteenth century, when Benthamite zeal for adaptation of the rules
of evidence to the successful development of the true facts of cases was
at its highest, the fall of such a rule would have inspired enthusiastic
approvals. Approval to-day, though general among those who know
about the case, is lukewarm. Too many other things seem so much
more important. The particular rule, however, did not and perhaps
could not fall until the ways of the legal profession had changed greatly
from as they were in mid-nineteenth century. It could not have fallen
until a majority of members of the Supreme Court had come to put
other ideals and aims ahead of that of maintaining seemingly mechanical
invariableness and certainty of law with respect to the sort of question
passed on in thw Funk case. It would not have fallen when it did in a
case greatly different in nature and importance from the Funk case-
which was a prohibition conviction up for affirmance or reversal after
the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Would the rule have fallen
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in a case in which the defendant whose wife's testimony had been ex-
cluded had been found guilty of kidnapping or counterfeiting?
The materiality of conditions was as indicia of the general states of
personal wills, desires and intellectual or emotional attitudes, both in
society at large and in the legal profession, with respect to the sort of
question which the Funk case raised. "Conditions" seems to be a word
for large or total complexes of personal forces, some fused and ener-
getic, others counting not inconsiderably even though diffused and
seemingly inert. But the direct forces, though they would not or could
not have acted as they did under materially different conditions, were of
personal will and choice among the members of the deciding court. And
their action has changed somewhat the conditions in which forces of
judicial will and choice will henceforth operate.
The point here of the Funk case is in its illumination of the present
condition of legal professional ways with respect to legal truth. Form-
of-words ways of the Uli-istic 'science' of automatic law pass current,
not as truths, but in lieu of truths as to how and why cases are decided.
Every sensible person who reads, even if not a lawyer, somewhat sees
through them. But no legal Uliao is yet clear, comprehensive or coher-
ent. And there are still many otherwise sensible persons who conceive
that an 'authoritative' body of such forms of words as those used in
the Funk case either is the law or constitutes the best or only evidence
we can get of what law is.
By way of approach to, and before submitting, what seems to me a
truer conception of law, I shall outline tome changes of legal aspect in
successive periods of Anglo-American history, seeking light from the
past on truth as well as illusion about law as it seems today.
II
CHANGING AsPECTS OF LAW BEFORE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Probably the members of primitive societies knew no such thing as
law in distinction from customary folkways. 14 While no distinction
was perceivable, there was no such thing. But even if no such collective
object of thought as folkways had yet arisen, everyone saw the difference
between conduct according to the ways and irregular conduct. And if
everyone occasionally deviated from the ways, the pressures of his fel-
lows, and also (if not rather) his own desires for comfort, respectabil-
ity and prestige, assured that he would on the whole pretty scrupulously
conform, or kill himself rather than endure the shame attached to con-
spicuous deviation. Whatever differences in degree of rigor might
1 4MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926); SUMNER,
FOLKWAYS (1906).
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develop between, say, customs of reciprocal gifts and services, of
matrilineal inheritance, incest taboos, and ways of making fishing im-
plements, there was no sharp differentiation of ways of dealing with
deviations.
It seems unlikely that-there was occasion to set up such an object of
thought as law, or have a word for communication about it, until inva-
sions and conquests had weakened customary ways (especially by min-
gling tribes) and friction-breeding irregularities of conduct had become
frequent.15 With that, folk courts-gentuths-arose to regularize ad-
justments of disputes; and their customary ways of proceeding (barely
at first, more and more sharply with time, distinguishable from general
folkways) and the customs whose violations gave rise to frictions
troublesome enough to seem worth their attention, became, as law, dif-
ferentiated from out-of-court procedural ways and "substantive" be-
havior patterns from which deviations made less trouble or were dealt
with without recourse to courts. 16
More or less concurrently, men of might with armed retainers-
ultimately kings or feudal lords-were violating with impunity customs
of their own folk as well as those of conquered peoples. No law could
control them. But in time, relations between rulers and subjects got
relatively stabilized. Rulers craved order in their own domains. A sort
of social quasi-contract arose everywhere, somewhat analagous to
primitive reciprocities, but different insofar as wretched but tolerable
instead of positively satisfactory existence was the inducement on one
side. By this quasi-contract the ruler gave his people their law, some-
what backing it with his power, and more or less, though unevenly,
restraining himself and his retainers from violations; his people in
return owed him loyalty and various irregularly regularized fiscal and
military services, and acknowledged in him an undefined, if never un-
limited, legislative power. And, in addition to folk-court procedural
ways and the folk-standards of conduct with deviations from which the
folk-courts dealt, law came to include incidents of property and status
founded in force and regularized by quasi-contractual acquiescence, and
also such commands of the plainly determinate sovereign as were dis-
tinguished as laws from his special occasional commands.
Law was not backed by power enough to deal with inter-group
" Occasion for a word and thing right would have arisen earlier. The estab-
lishment in other languages, of jus, droit, recht as words for law may be evidence
of the gradualness with which perception and distinction of the thing law came
about. I
IGOPPENHEI[ER, THE STATE (1908); JENKS, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
MIDDLE AGES (2d ed. 1913); POUND AND PLUCKNETT, READINGS (1927). Early
law, though its substantive norms were considerably taken for granted, was a
little more than "just procedure."
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conflicts or oppressions by "overmighty" subjects. Such things took
place outside of law, scarcely affecting it. Since little came into law
which was not approved by usage or responsive to almost universal de-
sires, legal ways seemed right and excellent as of course. Law was reg-
ular and certain. It seemed to exist independently of human wills and
choices. When conditions changed, and new ways were instituted, it
was in fact very much as if they had been found in the common con-
sciousness of the homogeneous community or class. The conception of
law which became orthodox arose spontaneously; there seemed no evi-
dence for any other. It probably came very close to fitting facts as they
were before society and law became national and complex.
Courts multiplied in the Middle AgesYt And in each sort, if not
each court, there were differences in the particular groupways and com-
mands of superior powers which constituted its law. The ideal was that
each place, class, status and relation-men of the manor, men of the
hundred, gildsmen, men of the chartered borough, merchants at the fair,
Jews, Christians, ecclesiastics, feudal barons, and land-holding gentry-
should have a law on the whole satisfactory to its members generally so
long as they did not kick against the pricks implicit in their status. And
perhaps this ideal came nearer to realization than is often the lot of
ideals. I suspect that the popular courts, at any rate, kept their respec-
tive laws flexibly harmonious with almost imperceptibly ever-changing
ways and mores of the fairly homogeneous groups that used them.
The main changes in what in England, as the popular courts declined,
law came to seem to be, were through the professional judges and law-
yers of the King's courts of so-called common law. These courts were
created and expanded as much in the interests of their royal proprietor
and his bench and bar (increase in royal as against baronial power;
revenue from fees for writs and inquests, amercements, and confisca-
tions) as in the interests of groups in which dissatisfaction with other
courts, especially for their dealings with disputes about feudal lands,
had become idespread. They not inconsiderably satisfied demands
or desires of their suitor class (1) for amplitude and convenience of
remedies and ( ) for definiteness and certainty of law. Mediaeval
thoughtways retained the abhorrence of primitive folk for deviation
from the well-known usual ways. Definiteness was so universally de-
sired that technical rigor would have seemed, at least in the earlier
period, a cheap price to pay for it. Only if strict and definite could
law seem a haven in the rough sea of mediaeval violence and chicane.
'7POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1899) ; MF!o~RIALS OF
LONDON IN THE 13TH, 14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES (ed. H. Riley, 1866) ; Hamilton,
The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1133; WOODBINE, CASES
IN MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY (unpublished).
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Vinogradoff' s paints as quaintly curious the mediaeval "custom of
Bologna": if an owner so much as barely touched his casks or bales
after they had been bound upon the carrier's donkey, the carrier was
relieved of his responsibility for safe carriage. Such a rule, at least in
its inception, would have seemed completely sensible. How could the
insuring carrier fairly bear the risk of loss from loosened straps or
damaged cofftainers or substitution of goods if those whose meddling he
would be least apt to oppose-the owners-could touch the goods at all
save at their peril? Strict rigors "flattered the longing for certainty and
for repose which is in every human mind"; and that "certainty generally
is illusion and repose is not the destiny of man"'19 was not as yet much
recognized. Yet then, as always, technical certainty bred uncertainty
and dissatisfaction. Desires for certainty and for amplitude and con-
venience of common-law remedies conflicted. A writ would become
available for a sort of grievance which was becoming frequent. Judges,
under pressure of hairsplitting lawyers, would define more and more
strictly the pattern case for which that writ could be used. If a plain-
tiff's case fitted to a T the pattern for the writ he bought, he might get
his remedy. But if it missed the pattern by a hair's breadth, he lost
and was amerced. In time a new writ would become available for cases-
of the hair's breadth different pattern; and more and more new writs
for other hair's breadth differences, until the ideal "for every wrong
a remedy" seemed abstractly almost achieved. But by then, unhappily,
the concrete merely human plaintiff would often be unable to know his
own case well enough to be sure which pattern it fitted, and his adver-
sary's chances of showing that he had mistaken his writ were multiplied.
When dissatisfaction with the uncertainty of over-certainty waxed loud
and strong enough, a new looser fitting writ (or later, a fiction), would
be made available. And the process of drawing and tightening distinc-
tions to the point of intolerably certain uncertainty would be repeated.
The common law seemed stable in spite of what at times was lib-
erality of innovation. Gradualness made some innovations impercep-
tible.20 That relaxing changes were satisfying on the whole to the class
which patronized the courts helped make them inconspicuous.2 ' To
any observer at any time changes bulked small in the total mass of
judicial doings. More obvious and more important to observers was the
fact that judges followed their own decisions as precedents, though
" CUSTOM AND RIGHT (1925).
"HOLMEs, The Path of the Law, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 181.
=' See the account of the origin of assumpsit in HOLmES, THE COMMON LAW(1881) Lect. VI.
"The inconspicuousness of satisfactory innovation is a favorite idea of Lle-
wellyn's; see his contribution to the Symposium on Frank's LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND, in (1931) 31 COLUMBIA LAW REv. 82.
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sometimes drawing fine distinctions and analogies. The ways of pro-
fessional judges and lawyers got more and more distinctly different from
the ways of ordinary folk. Lay customs (e.g., custom of merchants),
though sometimes resorted to pursuant to rule of law, got sharply dif-
ferentiated from law in speech and thought. Law seemed to, and for
most practical purposes did, consist only, except for statutes (now sub-
ject to judges' ways of dealing with them), of hard and fast clear-cut
rules fixed by precedents, with a womb from which slightly varying
clear-cut rules could be drawn, after long enough gestation, with forceps
of analogy and distinction.
The next major accretion to law was of "principles." "Principles"
became obvious constituents of the common law through, though at a
long distance from, its prerogative law rivals of the Tudor-Jacobean
period, which conquered pro tanto from their graves.
Whatever the vagueness of justice, natural law, "common right and
reason," or whatever it be called, there is always, at every time and place,
a considerable body of valuations of particular sorts of conduct in which
respectable people approach unanimity. This body of feelings was
incessantly outraged by the common law of Coke's time and the century
preceding. And the Chancery, with a flock of other prerogative courts
claiming to administer the law of God, Nature or Reason, shook and
threatened to overthrow the common law.22 A vast amount of what
every ordinarily benevolent person would call good justice was done by
these courts. A vast amount of what, by the same standard, was in-
justice was done at common law. Yet the flexibility of prerogative law
was intensely objectionable to the classes which, through the seven-
teenth century revolutions, won through to ultimate predominance in
English society.
In the war of Coke and his professional brethren to maintain
themselves and the common law and subject the Crown to it, the Puritan
middle class was with them. The Crown won more power of supporters
by its grants of Church lands or monopolies to favorite courtiers than
by its endeavors to prevent oppressions of the weak and humble and
make all classes in society at least tolerably well off in the condition in
which they were. The members of the growing middle class were not
content to be secure in the condition in which they were. They were
pressing eagerly to better their condition. They felt thwarted or en-
dangered not only when the Crown persecuted for schism or sedition,
but also when it restrained acquisitive wool-growers from expropriating
copyholders, or Puritan. merchants from cutting pounds of flesh to
ITAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1926); HOLDSWORTn,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1924) v. I, IV & V.
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which they were entitled by strict rule of common law, or crooks from
enforcing judgments. "Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a
measure, and know what to look to; but equity is the measure of the
Chancellor's foot; as that is longer or shorter, so too is equity. '23
Bacon, the greatest of the prerogative lawyers and one of the intellectual
giants of all time, could write about law with penetrating insight, and
devise intelligent plans for adapting it to harmonizing pursuits of the
twin objects which he saw as goals of effort: bonum suitatis, bonum
comiltunionis. The greatest common lawyer, Coke, for all his erudition,
shrewdness and personal might, had no vision except for effective ways
and means to whatever ends his childish spirit for the moment reached
at. Bacon, however, would sell judgments. Coke would stretch or twist
his sacred common law to suit his ends. But he was not for sale.
For better or worse-I can see no clear weight of evidence for
either value judgment-the middle class and common lawyers prevailed.
Coke and Locke defeated Bacon and Hobbes in competition for influ-
ence upon common thoughtways. The mediaeval conviction that only
"known, settled, established" rules can be "received and allowed by com-
mon consent to be the standard of right and wrong, ' 24 was confirmed in
most thoughtways in a position at least equal to that of the conviction
that law should be just. All the prerogative courts except the Chancery
were abolished. Chancery kept going by shortening its sails and trim-
ming them to the prevailing wind, hardening its equity into a body of
rules as definite, ultimately, as those of common law. Chancellors,
though they still from time to time educed new rules to satisfy demands
exigent and respectable enough to move them, and still on occasion used
language of Tudor-Jacobean prerogative justice, became sedulous to
maintain the appearance, and to a considerable extent the fact, of re-
sponding only to impersonal and unchanging law. Their ways became
almost indistinguishable from those of common-law judges except for
slight surface differences.
It was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century that the
conception of law as a body of known, certain, stable, established, settled
rules was deeply disturbed. The Tudor-Stuart prerogative version of
the Law of Nature (flexible equity) had temporarily ousted the Puritan
version (inflexible natural rights, approaching identity with usual rights
at common law) in most people's thoughtways. Even such common
lawyers as Blackstone, though it made little difference in their legal do-
ing, politely doffed their caps to it. And Lord Mansfield used it to sup-
port flagrant departures from usual ways at common law. The corn-
' SELDEN, TABLE T.A.L (c. 1654) tit. Equity.I LOcKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1690, ed. Dent) 143, 159-
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mon lawyers on the whole were outraged. But since Lord Mansfield
used "natural justice" for instead of against the still rising commercial
middle class, the legal ways opened to receive as rules mqst of his legis-
lative enactments. And though at his death they promptl closed to shut
out his undefined vague higher-than-legal principles, more definite
"legal principles," differing only in degree from rules, but more compre-
hensive and therefore less restrictive, were thenceforth increasingly
conspicuous in law.
As the nineteenth century wore on, precedents more and more freely
spawned principles as well as rules, and principles new precedents to
spawn new rules and principles. But the beginning of the century was
a period of conservative reaction and "strict law." In the United States
in their beginning judges and lawyers usually conceived law much as it
had been conceived in the Middle Ages, and took its rules from Coke
and Blackstone.
III
THE DIvERsIFICATION OF AMERICAN JUDICIAL WAYS BEFORE 1860
Never, probably, in the whole of human history, has what Bentham
called "Decision without Thought; or Mechanical Judicature"2 5 pre-
vailed without exception in the legal ways, or even in the pre-legal ways
of primitive societies. For legal and all other folk and group ways are
always in process of diversification and change.
This, roughly, is the process: Some bold and wilful person is
gripped by strong desire-perhaps for sexual intercourse with his
thirteenth cousin; perhaps to achieve some end which he frames as
noble. He deviates from the usual; and, through secrecy or subtlety
or might, avoids the usual unhappy consequences of deviation. Others,
similarly motived, imitate his deviation under somewhat similar cir-
cumstances. Each successful instance of deviation weakens the power
of faith that the one way for this or that is so and so to hold even
orthodox believers strictly in act and deed to the one way. In time,
with enough frequency of successful deviation, a way of deviation be-
comes established. Its precedents, including even precedents for follow-
ing it somewhat surreptitiously, become as respectable authorities for
conduct as the contrary mandates of precedents for older ways. Thus
the ways of the society or class or professional or other group become in
fact a tangle of inconsistencies. Assumption of their unchanging in-
variableness and harmony persists, however, in common thought, ob-
structing perception of diversities and deterring perceivers from telling
what they see.
'RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1826) Bk. i., c. 12; 7 WORKS OF JERE dY
BENTHAM (1843) 246.
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American legal ways have always contained inconsistencies: com-
peting assumptions as to what law and the scope of judicial power ought
to be; competing general ways of deciding how to decide, pursued
privately in the seeming obscurity of judicial breasts whose walls are not,
however, untransparent; competing ways tf dressing decisions for
public inspection; innumerable particular tricks and patterns for making
or dressing decisions of particular sorts of questions. A cinematic
photograph showing every flickering detail in the huge kaleidoscope of
ways for over a centu1fy, if it could be made, would carry little meaning.
I shall here attempt only a broad outline, with particular attention to the
spread of the practice of deciding according to views of reasonableness
under circumstances.
1. Free and Mechanical Jvdicature in the time of Kent and Marshall.
In the United States before 1840, in a very large unascertainable
proportion of instances, decision was without thought except for what
usual habits made the obvious construction of precedent or statutory
provision, and judicature was in fact mechanical. In another large
proportion of instances decisions, though similarly dressed, were, if
those are right who believe.that all human conduct is mechanically de-
termined, resultants of very different mechanical forces from those
which control when judges follow precedents or provisions as if no
alternative were open to them. For the sake of having single words
with which to distinguish such decisions from the other sort, I shall
call them unmechanical, or free.
All the important constitutional decisions of the period seem to me
to have been unmechanical. Also unmechanical were decisions "adapt-
ing to American conditions" doctrines of English common law,-includ-
ing equity, so far as tolerated in the United States.2 6 So were those in
countless obscure cases in which evasion of old rules or choice between
them was determined by judges' views of justice or reasonableness. So
also were many, if not most, decisions in cases important to important
and political and economic personages. The biggest personages were
land speculators and bankers. Decisions in great land cases were often
favorable to large speculators, even though black with fraud. As to
leading banks, it is said that in many places no lawyer would take cases
against them. When local personages took to incorporating their busi-
ness enterprises, old technicalities as to corporations were explained
away.27
- See, e.g., Story's opinions in Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. (U. S.) 137 (1829),
and Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason C. C. (C. C. Maine 1824) ; Parker v. Simpson,
180 Mass. 334, 62 N. E. 401 (1902).
-'As to land speculators, see, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87
(1810); 3 BEVERIDGE, LiFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919) c. 10; Nelles & King,
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Since unmechanical decisions are more interesting than the other
sort, there is danger of magnified impressions of their relative number
and importance. I suspect that they were greatly outnumbered by me-
chanical decisions; and that, in spite of the importance of exceptions,
mechanical judicature had become more usual at the end of the early
period than it had been at the outset. The initial hostility to English
common law had probably on the whole intensified the common law
orthodoxy of the lawyers who withstood it. The authority of Black-
stone was rarely challenged. Lord Mansfield Was respected and his
decisions followed. But his way of resort to natural justice for author-
ity had no open vogue. It was felt that ancient rigors could properly be
tempered only by legislation. Some of them were. But reform statutes
and procedural codes were not unlikely to be construed as consistent
with the survival of rules which their framers had intended to abolish.
The influence of Kent, the most attractive personally of the early
judges, and surely the most eminent in non-constitutional fields, was
strongly towards orthodoxy. He said 28 that when he went on the bench
in 1799, "we had no law of our own, and nobody knew what it was."
His personal way was to look where justice lay; "the moral sense," he
said, "decided the cause half the time." In his moral sense, however,
there was seldom much conflict between justice and English legal
usuals. If justice sometimes defeated authority in his private forum, he
rarely if ever said so in published opinions. In those he set himself "to
bear down opposition, or flame it, by exhausting research and over-
whelming authority." And it was in respect for authority that he was
mainly imitated by lesser judges who added their stones to his in the
erection of the "temple of our jurisprudence." The creed taught in that
temple was that Impersonal Law flows through judges who "have no
will of their own in any case."'20 And while faith was strong, judicature
was on the whole mechanical, in spite of the multiplication of exceptions
made more br less inconspicuous by the ostrich method of hiding their
heads in sand.
The least inconspicuous exceptions in the early period were Mar-
shall's great decisions. They established unmechanical ways of deciding
in actual preeminence in the constitutional field. And the suggestive
power of their obvious though covert actuality there, though curbed by
Contempt by Publication (1928) 28 COLUMBIA LAW REV. 401, 423 ff.; SOKOLSKI,
THE GREAT AMERICAN LAND BUBBLE (1932).
As to bank influence, 4 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra, c. 4.
As to corporations, ANGELL & AMES, CORPORATIONS (1832); HENDERSON,
POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918);
Bank v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 64 (1827).
'Letter to Thomas Washington (1828) in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMESi-
CAN LEGAL HISTORY (1907) 843-5. The letter was not published till 1897.
See Marshall, in Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738, 866 (1824).
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assumption that they are rarely proper elsewhere, has been a tremendous
factor in their covert spread into other legal fields. It will be worth
while therefore to dwell somewhat upon constitutional ways in their
beginnings.
The original popular view of the Constitution, always so widely
and so deeply held that open inconsistency and explicit contradiction are
still taboo in the judicial ways, was restated with grave sincerity in a
judicial opinion rendered only a few weeks ago.3 0 The substance of the
passage follows. Though the contrasting matter as to the flexibility of
the common law would not have been orthodox or even possible in the
early period, it seems material to include it.
"Constitutional grants of power and restrictions upon the exercise of
power are not flexible as the doctrines of the common law are flexible."
The doctrines of the common law, "upon the principles of the common law
itself, modify or abrogate themselves whenever they are or wherever they
become plainly unsuited to different or changed conditions."" Constitutional
provisions, on the other hand, are unbending. Authoritative voices have
said clearly that this is so. Among them, Justice Brewer's :32 "The Con-
stitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter.
That which it meant when adopted it means now." Also Taney's: "As
long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the
same words but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke
when it came from the hands of its framers and was voted on and adopted
by the people of the United States." Also Judge Cooley's:' "What a
court is to do, therefore, is to declare the law as written, leaving it to the
,people themselves to make such changes as new circumstances may re-
quire." Since great jurists speak thus, what they say is true. "The whole
aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is to dis-
cover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its framers
and the people who adopted it."
This, fiom the beginning, has been orthodox. It has never been
true. The flexibility of the Constitution has been much more obvious
than that of the common law.3 5 And the aim of .construction has been
to adapt it to consistency with policies deemed expedient by the con-
struers.
The conditions, or complexes of demands, to which the Constitu-
tion bends have always included competing demands that it be construed
The Minnesota Moratorium Case, supra note 1.
Citing the Funk case, supra note 9.
In South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 448-9 (1905).
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (U. S.) 393, 426 (1856).
2 In 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LImiTATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 124.
This conclusion is confirmed and documented by Corwin in his Storrs Lec-
tures at Yale, 1934 (title for publication not yet determined).
The nature of the de facto Constitution is vividly explained by Llewellyn, The
Constitution as an Institution (1934) 34 COLuMBrA LAw RFv. 1.
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consistently with rival suppositions as to its original intent or meaning.
And it is part of the technique of constitutional adaptation to present
changes as consistent with one or another such supposition. Evidence
of original intent and meaning is therefore studied for use in argument
of the authenticity of suppositions. But even if, for all constitutional
questions, original intents or meanings, authentic beyond reasonable
doubt, were always discoverable, they could not prevail by reason of their
authenticity alone. If they meant to bind the future by a written in-
strument, the founders were attempting the impossible.
With respect to many constitutional questions determination of true
original intent is forever impossible. For there was much disagreement
among the people who adopted the written instrument. The intent of
the framers, or at least what they would'probably have desired had the
question occurred to them, is usually ascertainable. For most of them
agreed in desire for advancement of monied interests and protec-
tion against popular majorities .3  The people who adopted the Con-
stitution, however, were an heterogeneous and inharmonious body.
What proportion were in agreement with the framers is unascertainable.
A very large, though also unascertainable, number of persons regarded
the proposed Constitution with misgivings if not aversion. Their com-
mon fear was that under it popular interests would have little weight.
3 7
Adoption was secured with difficulty, and barely. It could not have
happened without the consent or acquiescence of many persons in whom
this fear was strong. To propitiate them the proponents of the Con-
stitution reiterated assurances that the fear was groundless; that the
powers of the federal gov&nment would be few and narrow; that they
would be strictly construed; that popular interests, usually referred to
as "natural rights," would be safe in the keeping of the undiminished
popular governments of the states. 38
In spite of the resulting discrepancies between what its proposers
"1 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. suprc note 27, at 288-480; 1 PARRINGTON, MAIN CUR-
RENTS IN AMERIcAN THOUGHT (1926) 267 ff.; BEARD, AN ECONOlIC INTERPRE-
TATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913).
'The following was a typical crude expression: "These lawyers, and men of
learning, and moneyed men, that talk so finely and gloss over matters so smoothly,
t6 make us poor illiterate people swallow the pill . . . expect to be the managers
of this Constitution, and get all the power and all the money into their own hands,
and then they will swallow up all us little folks, like the great Leviathan, Mr.
President; yes, just as the whale swallowed up Jonah." Amos Singletary, in the
Massachusetts ratifying convention, 2 ELLIOr's DEBATES (1866) 100-103.
"One of the most amusing (in the light of history) of these assurances was by
Alexander Hamilton in the New York ratifying convention: "The people have an
obvious and powerful protection in their state governments. Should anything
dangerous be attempted, these bodies of perpetual observation will be capable of
forming and conducting plans of regular opposition. Can we suppose the people's
love of liberty will not, under the incitement of their legislative leaders, be roused
into resistance, and the madness of tyranny extinguished at a blow?" Id. at 246 ff.
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intended or desired and what a good many of the offerees naturally
understood the Constitution to mean, its original meaning was in many
respects indisputable. And clearness was not confined to such provisions
as that no one below the age of thirty-five could become President; the
contract clause, for instance, had meanings which even adopters who
did not like them would have conceded as intended. But as to questions
of the limits of broadly stated powers and limitations, or of the policy or
ideals which should inform their construction, it is impossible to find a
common intent, desire or understanding among the framers of the Con-
stitution and the people who adopted it.
Of Marshall's great decisions, none was principally determined by
supposed obligation to give effect to the original intent of the people
who adopted it. And only two-Marbury v. Madison and Sturges v.
Crouninshield-involve constructions which dubious acquiescers in
adoption might have conceded as intended.
In M4arbury v. Madison3" Marshall wanted to discredit the adminis-
tration of Jefferson without exposing his court to the humiliation of
making a decree which it would have been impotent to enforce. Having
said, with judicial immoderation, that Marbury was entitled to a man-
damus requiring the Secretary of State to issue his judicial commission,
he avoided granting it by holding unconstitutional the statute by which
Congress had tried to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction in inandanius.
Whatever their objections to assertion and exercise of judicial
power of life and death over statutes with such an object, dubious
acquiescers in adoption of the Constitution might, if cool and candid,
have conceded that such power had been intended in 1787. For expecta-
tion that such power would be wielded had been stated without contra-
diction by leaders of both sides.40
To allay fears of so enormous a political innovation, advocates of
adoption had represented that its use would be to prevent federal ex-
pansions and encroachments. In no conspicuous instance did Marshall
use it with that object. He used it oppositely in M'Culloch v.
Maryland.41 The War of 1812 was over when the second Bank of the
United States was chartered. "Necessity" for the execution of federal
powers of sword and purse, in the sense of convenience to that end, was
rather a pretext than a reason for the creation of this mighty interstate
convenience to the private pecuniary profit of its managers and their
business friends. The emergency conditions of "commercial and finan-
'1 Cranch (U. S.) 137 (1803). See 1 WARREN, THE SUPREmE COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1926) c. 5; CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW (1914) ; 3 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 27, c. 1-3.
' BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912).
414 Wheat. (U. S.) 316 (1819). See 4 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 27, c. 4-7.
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cial chaos" in the post-war depression afforded more substantial reasons.
The main object of the first Bank had been somewhat similar-stabiliza-
tion of currency and credit in the speculative orgy stimulated by the
inflation resulting from Hamilton's Funding Plan. Both Banks were
socially desirable if a Hamiltonian federal policy of paternal solicitude
for the increase of commerce, manufactures and concentrated private
wealth was socially desirable. Every intelligent person's opinion on
such a question depends upon how he wants to live himself and what
sorts of people and ways of living he likes to have about him. When
the Constitution was adopted there were some who feared as disease
the small beginnings which were within a century to make most Ameri-
cans dependents or parasites upon concentrations of wealth, and who
considerately desired the United States to be forever a nation of
ruggedly self-reliant economic small fry.4 2 And though there were never
many Jeffersonians besides Jefferson himself-who, moreover, being
in politics, was inconsistent-there were originally great numbers of
such small fry. Had it been generally understood in 1787 that the
federal powers enumerated in the instrument could stretch to include
power to promote the Hamiltonian policy, there would have been small
chance for the Constitution's adoption. This had little if any bearing,
however, upon the question of the constitutionality of the second Bank.
The opposing forces were complex. There were intelligently convinced
Hamiltonians on one side and Jeffersonians on the other who were "dis-
interested" in the sense of being unconcerned for personal pecuniary
advantage. On each side also were numbers of similarly "disinterested"
persons dominated by sentimental loyalties or prejudices. And at the
back or front of each side were energetic persons more directly and
virulently interested: the Bank and its business and political satellites
and their dependents; its state bank rivals and their satellites and de-
pendents. The decision purported to weigh the soundness of each side's
earnest claims as to original intent or meaning of the Constitution, and
to find and rest on truth with respect thereto. But it was induced by
Hamiltonian convictions of social value, and settled nothing as to the
constitutionality of a Bank before 1792 or in the time of Jackson.
M'Culloch v. Maryland and its tailpiece, Osborn v. The Bank,
43
were the most unpopular of Marshall's decisions. But they were no re-
moter from original intent and meaning of the written instrument than
his one popular decision, Gibbons v. Ogden.4 4 That was objectionable
only to the negligible few who deplored its demotion from sanctity of a
42 10 JEFFERSON'S WRITINGS (Ford, 1892-9) 34-5; BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND
HAMILTON (1925) ; JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED (1820).
' 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738 (1824).
"9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1 (1824), see 4 BEVERIDGE, op. cL. supra note 27, c. 8.
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vested property right. The Livingston-Fulton monopoly of steam trans-
portation in New York waters was the same in kind as the Charles River
toll bridge monopoly which Marshall thought should be sustained.4 5 An
act forbidding states to restrict traffic on water highways connecting them
with other states would have been clearly enough within the original
intent with which Congress was empowered to regulate interstate com-
merce. But original intent that such regulations should be enacted by
Congress, not the Court, was equally clear. And Congress had enacted
nothing inconsistent with the Livingston-Fulton monopoly. Marshall
purported, to be sure, to find that it had done so-by construction of an
act to prevent smuggling.46 That act contained no provision even smell-
ing of intent to prevent states from conditioning the use of their navi-
gable waters as they pleased, unless by provisions facilitating frauds on
the federal revenue. But for Congress to open all navigable waters to
steamboats without Livingston-Fulton licenses would have seemed de-
sirable to almost everybody everywhere. So why should not constitu-
tional law, like equity, regard that as done which ought to be done? It
did-sprouting seed whose later crop was a judicially re-written Com-
merce Clause.
Marshall's one incontestible consistency with original intent and
meaning was in Sturges v. Crowninshield.47 No one who reads the Con-
tract Clause with knowledge of events in the so-called "critical period"
can doubt ihat it then meant that states should never, whatever the emer-
gency or depth of depression, relieve debtors by stay laws or moratoria.
A fortiori, if they could not postpone debts, they cotild not provide for
their cancellation on part payment. In the year of depression 1819
Marshall so held, in the case of a state bankruptcy law which would have
relieved a bankrupt of obligation to pay fully, if and when he ever could,
a debt contracted before its enactment. And he dissented when, a few
years later, his colleagues, "yielding to popular insistence," sustained a
similar bankruptcy law in its application to debts contracted after its
enactment.48
In other cases, however, Marshall himself construed the Contract
Clause as having meanings which there is no evidence that anyone would
have been likely to think it had in the beginning. Suppose the proponents
0
" Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420 (1837). See 1
WARREN, op. cit. supra note 39, at 746, 773, 790; 2 id. at 21-38.
'1 STAT. 305 (1793). On giving bond not to defraud the revenue, coasting
vessels were to be licensed, and thereby exempted from customs inspections and port
duties.
" 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 117 (1819). See 4 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. supra note 27, at
208-219.
4' Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 213 (1827). 4 BEVERIDGE, op. cit. sUpra
note 27, at 480.
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of the Constitution had promulgated the following in 1787 : "This clause
means, among other things, that no state can rescind a grant of millions
of acres of land which was induced by wholesale corruption of its legis-
lature ;49 it means also that no state can rescind or amend a corporate
charter unless granted on that condition."50  Had these meanings been
clear, would the Constitution have been adopted? In Fletcher v. Peck
even Marshall hinted uncertainty as to whether it was the Contract
Clause or something higher which forbade Georgia's rescission of its
grant to speculators of all the land in Alabama and Mississippi. Both
parties to the case wanted a decision validating the claims of holders un-
der the corrupt grantees.. The agreed facts presented such a holder as
bona fide purchaser for value of his speculative paper title, without notice
of the corruption whose public notoriety had been considerable. Mar-
shall said:
"It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government
does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power and if any be
prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an individual,
fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation? ...
It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the court, that ... the state of
Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which are common
to free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the constitution of the
United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in
the premises so purchased could be . . . rendered null and void."'"
And for a century thereafter the game of buying gifts from legislative
bodies, and washing them clean by transit through "bona fide pur-
chasers," was played repeatedly, to the advancement of wealth of or in
the nation.
There is no intention of suggesting that any of these cases, or any
other case specifically mentioned elsewhere in this article, was not de-
cided as the deciders sincerely believed was for the best. How and why
for the best? Best for what? Hard questions. Therefore better left
unanswered. It is enough, the judge can tell himself, that conscience tell
me I am right. Hamiltonian aims and values lived on and propagated
after Hamilton was shot. But Hamiltonian lucidity was self propagated
less easily. If any judge had it before Holmes, he kept it shut up in
recesses of his being. Most judges, probably, have been put partly ajid
incoherently aware of their own deepest grounds for unmechanical de-
cisions. The ways of their profession have relieved them from even
trying to become articulately clear respecting them. If, conforming with
'Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87 (1810).
'Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 518 (1819). See 4 BEvERiDGE,
op. cit. supra note 27, c. 5.
" See 6 Cranch (U. S.) 87, 133-9 (1810).
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the ways, they gave decisions surface dressings of plausible if specious,
claims of consistency with and compulsion by "true" or "original" intent
or meaning of constitutional provision, statute, precedent, rule, or, at a
pinch, of principle, few lawyers, except in cases as nation-shaking as
M'Cidloch v. Maryland, would risk professional respectability by telling
what they saw beneath the surface if they looked there. And non-
lawyers were usually too much baffled by the complexity of legal surfaces
to see through them.
Decision at choice commonly proceeded upon assumption, commonly
sincere, that there was a vague but organic connection between imper-
sonal law and common right and reason. The usual process was argu-
ment that right and reason compel some desired "construction" of par-
ticular provisions or precedents. Those who liked the practical result
of the "construction" would easily agree (1) that it was right and rea-
sonable, and therefore (2) expressive of the "true" or original intent
or meaning of the provisions or precedents, and therefore (3) compulsive
upon the court. Occasionally, however, as in Fletcher v. Peck, it was
uncomfortably obvious that no particular provisions or precedents could
reasonably be "construed" as prescribing the desired decision. Candor
then tended to compel the court to derive it from common right and
reason almost nakedly-though a sort of fig leaf could be provided by"
presenting common right and reason, paraphrased into "general prin-
ciples common to free institutions," as the ultimate Law of Laws, brood-
ing behind and breathing through all particular provisions and prec-
edents, and filling the gaps their human authors had left between them.
This way of perfecting impersonal law was not unconnected with
the more usual legal ways. It had long hung, somewhat precariously,
at their outskirts. The line of precedents by which it hung stretched
thinly back at least to Coke. Coke, himself a graduate of the University
of Cambridge, once had before him Dr. Bonham, whose degree in
physic was from Cambridge. Coke was convinced that Cambridge
made as good physicians as could be made anywhere. It followed that
Dr. Bonham's competence to well practice physic was beyond question.
Therefore a statute could not be construed as authorizing a Board of
Censors to punish Bonham for practicing in London without its license.
For that would be "against common right and reason. 15 2 This was the
12 Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 114a (1610). See Plucknett, Bonham's
Case and Judicial Review (1926) 40 HARv. L. Riv. 30.
This was, I think, the only instance in which Coke openly put "common right
and reason" ahead of "the artificial reason of the law." It became familiar and
popular in America through frequent resort to it (of course without reference to
the facts of Bonham's Case) in the agitation which preceded the Revolution. See
James Otis's argument on the Writs of Assistance, WoRxs OF JorN ADAmS, i, 523.
After the Revolution Hamilton used it in Rutgers v. Waddington, FxsKE, CRiTicAL
PERIOD (1892) 127. *
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main authority in America for perfecting constitutions by common
right and reason. For though Lord Mansfield might have seemed a
better authority than Coke for common right and reason at common
law, he had not used it against statutes. And Marshall was probably
typical of most judges of his time in what seems to have been his feel-
ing that strict conformity with rigid ways at common law was a sort
of price due for his freer hand in constitutional cases.53
2. it the time of Shata and Taney.
Until after 1860 orthodox faith was not much shaken-faith that
Impersonal Law flows through judicial ministers who are impotent to
affect it. This could be taken for granted as unquestionable even by
judges and lawyers whose own practices were undermining the creed
they clung to, almost knowing better.
Shaw was the next great underminer after Marshall. He instituted
a way of viewing law which would permit occasional almost open use
of Lord Mansfield's freedom in non-constitutional cases without shock
to faith. His statement of it was as follows :4
"It is one of the great merits and advantages of the common law, that,
instead of a series of detailed practical rules, established by positive pro-
visions, and adapted to the precise circumstances of particular cases,
which would become obsolete and fail, when the practice and course of
business, to which they apply, should cease or change, the common law
consists of a few broad and comprehensive principles, founded on reason,
natural justice, and enlightened public policy."
He made no attempt to state the few broad principles of which the
common law consists. The consideration of "equity, natural justice,
and that general convenience which is public policy" from which prin-
ciples proceed seemed to him indeed to be "too vague and uncertain for
practical purposes." But the legal rules derived from these impractically
vague sources "are rendered, in good degree, precise and certain, for
practical purposes, by usage and judicial precedent." Do the principles
become, for practical purposes, also certain through the rules? Somewhat,
it would seem; for when a case comes which no precedent will fit, "the
general principle applicable to [meaning inferrabIc from?] cases most
nearly analogous" governs decision-or rather, somewhat governs; for
it may have to be modified "by considerations of fitness and propriety,
reason and justice," which grow out of the circumstances.
'See Head & Amory v. The Providence Ins. Co., 2 Cranch (U. S.) 127
(1804) ; and Bank v. Dandridge, 9 How. (U. S.) 64 (1827).
" See Norway Plains Co. v. B. & M. R. Co., 1 Gray 263, 266 (Mass. 1854).
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Ever since Shaw launched it, this conception of law as consisting
of impractically vague higher principles, operating judicial automata
with the same mechanical precision as rules and precedents, has been
approaching, though not reaching, coordinate standing, in the ways
with the conception of law as consisting of specific mandates plain on
the face of precedents. .Lawyers and judges have respected both con-
ceptions without concern for their consistency, but have usually kept
their practice as consistent as possible with the latter. Perhaps the con-
ceptions are reconcilable as follows: The higher principles hover ob-
scurely over all legal fields, not ousting rules and precedents from usual
practical control, but occasionally alighting here and there to leave new
rules and precedents for mechanical judicature.
Few judges have felt sure enough of their own strength to risk
presenting judicial choices naked except for arguments of their justice
or expediency. Shaw himself preferred to dress them as consistent with
precedents or their analogy. At this he was adroit. In Commonwealth
v. Hunti5 for example, his reversal of a lator conspiracy conviction
was determined by a sagacious view of political and economic policy in
the conditions of 1842; he dressed it plausibly as based on the rule
that an indictment must be construed strictly. His veils were sometimes
thinner. Among his contemporaries, however, few but disgrtntled
fanatics were disturbed if they saw through them. For most of Shaw's
choices, though not alL)56 were based upon incontestibly accurate per-
ceptions of what would work for "general convenience"-i.e., the sat-
isfaction of most people who mattered in his own time and place. Where
most of the members of an old Puritan congregation had become
Unitarians, Shaw gave them property in the meeting house as against
the Congregationalist rump.5 7 Since railroads were few and new and
weak, and everyone wanted them to grow and thrive, why not relieve
them of insurer's responsibility for freight discharged at their own
depots, though not yet delivered to the consignees ?58 While their lines
were short and employees few, and probably in intimate personal re-
lations, it might also seem sensible to most people to say that adoption
of the Fellow Servant Rule would make railway servants hold one an-
other to high standards of care, diminishing the risks of travel for the
'4 Metc. 111 (Mass. 1842). The case name is the title of my article in
(1932) 32 COLUMBIA LAw REv. 1128.
' These are among his more controversial decisions: Com. v. Kneeland, 20
Pick. 206 (Mass. 1838) ; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295 (Mass. 1850); Com. v.
Anthes, 5 Gray 185 (Mass. 1855).
" In a line of cases commencing with Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. 172 (Mass.
1830).
'Norway Plains Co. v. B. & M. R. Co., 1 Gray 263 (Mass. 1854).
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public.59 This rule, however, maintained and followed by mechanical
jurists, made trouble later. So did the doctrine that liability must be
based on fault with which Shaw superfluously supported a sensible de-
cision.60 The case was this: A man was separating fighting dogs.
His up-raised stick struck a bystander behind him, who sued. The
trial judge charged that the defendant was liable for the battery unless
justified, and that separating fighting dogs was not a legal duty and
therefore not a justification. Shaw set aside the verdict.
While Shaw, mainly in other fields, was strengthening the way of
deciding, almost openly, in accordance with views of common right and
reason, justice, general convenience, utility for the greatest good of
the greatest number, natural law, general principles common to free
institutions, expediency, reasonableness under the circumstances, or
whatever one prefers to call it, the Supreme Court under Taney was
confirming the preEminence of that way in the constitutional field. The
Taney court's differences from Marshall had that tendency.0 1 So did
its expression of its internal differences in voluminous separate opinions.
The justices of the Supreme Court were, however, chary of un-
mechanical decisions except in constitutional cases. Their general atti-
tude is illustrated in the otherwise unimportant case of United States
v. Reid.62
In a federal court in Virginia, Reid had been found guilty of
murder on the high seas. He had offered a co-defendant not on trial
as a witness. The two trial judges ruled that the co-defendant was in-
competent to testify. On motion for a new trial they differed as to
whether this ruling had been right, and certified the question to the
Supreme Court.
If a Virginia statute of 1849 were applicable, the co-defendant
should have been allowed to testify. The Judiciary Act0 3 provided
that "the laws of the several states," except where federal Constitution,
treaties or statutes otherwise require, "shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law" in the federal courts. But a trial
for a federal crime is not at common law. And it could not be sup-
posed unless it expressly said so that Congress had empowered other
sovereignties, the states, to prescribe rules in trials for offences against
the United States. By its omission to say anything about rules for such
trials Congress must have intended to refer the federal courts "to some
'Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. Co., 4 Metc. 49 (Mass. 1842).
Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. 292 (Mass. 1850).
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420 (1837) ; Mayor
of New York v. Mil'n, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 102 (1837) ; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky,
11 Pet. (U. S.) 257 (1837).
"12 How. (U. S.) 361 (1851).
1 STAT. 92, c. 20, § 34 (1789) ; U. S. C. A. § 725.
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known and established rule" which it supposed to be "so familiar and
wel understood" that specification would be superfluous. "The only
known rule upon the subject which can be supposed to hav6 been in the
minds of the men who framed these acts of Congress, was that which
was then in force in the respective States, and which they were ac-
customed to see in daily and familiar practice in the State courts."
Congress has therefore, by necessary implication, enacted that each
federal court shall apply in criminal cases the testimonial law of the
state in which it sits as it stood in 1789. And in Virginia in 1789 co-
defendants had been incompetent to testify.
Taney and his colleagues were not blood-thirsty men. They could
not have reflected with satisfaction upon the result which presumably
followed their decision-the hanging of a man without benefit of
evidence which might have established his innocence. Had they felt
free to choose, they might have preferred the Virginia law as it had been
since 1849, permitting co-defendants to testify, to the old rule of ex-
clusion. If they could have brought themselves to hold the Virginia
statute applicable, by construing the Judiciary Act as prescribing for
each federal court the testimonial law of its state as of the time of trial,
no one would very strongly have objected, and a considerable weight of
opinion would have been approving. For Jeremy Bentham had already
given wide currency to the principle which in the Funk64 case was called
"the fundamental basis of all rules of evidence"-the principle that
testimonial law should be well adapted to the successful development of
the true facts of cases. Bentham had, moreover, specified the rule ex-
cluding co-defendants, and also all the other old rules of exclusion
which have fallen since, as peculiarly flagrant instances of ill adaptation
to that end.65 The time was of reform, and Bentham was the hero of
all intelligent reformers. Some of the reform waves, more or less
Benthamite in inception, with which the times abounded were, to be
sure, meeting intense opposition-especially those for codification of
law, popular election of judges, prohibition, and abolition of slavery.
But other reforms had won general approval: free public education, for
example, penal reform, abolition of imprisonment for debt, mechanics'
liens, and many piecemeal abrogations or changes of archaic rules of
common law such as the Virginia act of 1849 illustrates."6 Though
Taney and most of his colleagues disapproved of abolitionists and doubt-
" 54 Sup. Ct. 212 (1933).
0 Op. cit. supra note 25; BENTHAM'S WORKS, vol. VI and VII. Dumont's
condensation of Bentham's treatise had previously been published in the London
Law Journal, and in book form in 1825.
' See DIcEY, op. cit. supra note 6. Among ardent American Benthamites
were Edward Livingston, Robert Rantoul, Jr., and David Dudley Field.
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less also of codifiers who declaimed loosely against the common law,
they were not purblind reactionaries. I strongly suspect that they were
Benthamite enotigh to have welcomed permission of co-defendants'
testimony in the federal courts had Congress expressly granted it.
But they did not feel free to grant such a permission themselves, or
see a possibility of doing it except for federal courts in states whose
statutes gave it. This possibility seemed blocked by a higher principle
than that rules should make for getting at the truth. For they assumed
that if they should hold now that federal trials for crimes against the
nation were subject to truth-serving state statutory rules of witnesses'
competency, it would follow that they were holding, or would have to
hold later, that federal criminal trials were subject to whatever rules of
competency state legislatures might enact, not excluding rules tending to
defeat truth or national sovereignty. Even judges who were Democrats
and Southerners could shudder 'at such an enormity. And it was not
yet possible for any judge to say, or even think, such a thing as Holmes's
"The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.'" 7
Such a proposition would have seemed of anarchy, not law.
The Taney court had, to be sure, for use on occasion, the concept
of a higher common law, known to federal judges, and endowed, at
least in instances, with power to constrain them to decisions contrary
to what passed as common law in the courts of the states in which they
sat.68 They might logically have said what the Funk case today takes for
granted-that this common law, instead of the respective common laws
of the several states as of 1789, determined competency to testify in
federal criminal cases; and held that this common law, adapted by its
principles to changed conditions of which the Virginia statute was some
evidence, made co-defendants competent as witnesses in federal criminal
trials in all the states, regardless of their statutes. But this could not
have occurred to them. Occasions when the questions were of such
things as competency to testify were not within the undefined class of
occasions on which resort to this concept, or any freedom to legislate
judicially, seemed to them fitting or even possible.
The class of occasions fit for judicial legislation was, as it still is,
defined unverbally in the ways by'the feelers of judges' minds or souls.00
If judicial legislation was not confined to adaptation of law to business
convenience or prosperity, that, since Lord Mansfield's time, had been
its most frequent and professionally respectable object.
Taney and his colleagues gave a holder of negotiable paper suing
See Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928).
'Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1 (1842).
' See CARDOZO, op. cit. supra note 9.
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in a federal court a more liberal rule as to consideration than he might
get in a court of the same state; 70 promoted improved facilities for
transportation by destroying the Charles River bridge monopoly ;71
opened the federal courts to suits by corporations through a flagrant
fiction ;72 and gave to corporations right to do business in states in which
they had no legal existence. 7 3 But they could not dream of overruling
a long customary rule as to competency to testify even if they would
have liked to and none but rule-bound lawyers would have minded. The
ways included no custom of legislating on such a subject, or with the
object of better adaptation of rules to truth. Their judicial honor, their
sworn duty, their professional respectability, required them to keep law
there as they found it, untouched by personal desires, even if for juster
justice. They must indeed lean backwards to avoid such infiltration of
their desires into law. The air they had always breathed was saturated
with medieval-Puritan-Coke-Locke assumption that only a law of
known, certain, definite, stable, established rules is tolerable. When the
silence of the Judiciary Act of 1789 made it hard to find the law which
they must keep intact, and put them under unavoidable necessity of
legislative choice, they must, to feel sure of their own judicial integrity,





.0 Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1 (1842).
"Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. (U. S.) 420 (1837).
"Louisville R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. (U. S.) 497 (1844) ; Marshall v. B. &
0. R. Co., 16 How. (U. S.) 314 (1853).
' Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 519 (1839). See HENDERSON, op.
cit. supra note 27.
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